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Union presence has a complex effect on absenteeism, a tudy find 
Controlling absenteeism: Union and nonunion differences 
Steve Markham and Dow Scott 
A lthough ab enteeism has been at its lowest level in several decade , the current 
economjc recovery fore hadow an 
increase in ab enteeism as the fear 
of job loss lessens among em-
ployees. This growth in absenteeism 
will represent a sub tantial co t to 
business ( ee teers & Rhodes, 
1978). In anticipation of this prob-
lem, managers should again turn 
their attention to this concern. 
One of the traditional "barriers" 
to the implementation of new 
employee programs and policies 
has been unjons. Despite the belief 
that union presence is thought Lo be 
associated with high level of 
absenteeism, comparatively little 
research has examined the relation-
ship of unions and absenteeis m. 
Because of the importance of the 
labor movement in the American 
economy and the common 
managerial belief that unions in-
crease labor co ts by restricting 
management's Oex.ibility, this 
research examines unfons' effects 
on ab enteeism and attendance 
control methods. 
The lite rature 
Based on the ir considerable e fforts 
lo maintain a union-free status, 
managers apparently agree 
that important difference exist be-
tween unionized and nonunionized 
organizations, and that the latter is 
definitely preferable. These dif-
ferences are often referred to in 
books (usually in terms of how to 
remain union-free) and in manage-
ment seminars. One of the under-
lying concerns is a difference ar-
ticulated by Beavers (1976) in the 
ASPA Handbood of Personnel and 
Industrial Relations: 
onunion organizations are quite 
different from unionized 
organizations. in wruch-despite 
euphemistic statements to the 
contrary-the relationship be-
l\veen employees and manage-
ment may be that of adversaries. 
(Beavers. 1976: 7 /55) 
Based on these assumed dif-
ferences, Foulkes ( 1980) con-
ducted a study that compared per-
sonnel policies and practices of 
large nonunion companies to tho e 
of large union companies in the 
United States . Foulkes reported 
that personnel policies are sub lan-
tially different in unionized and 
nonunionized organizations in 
Steve Markham is an associate 
professor of management at 
Vi~nia Polyteclmic lnstiLute 
and State University. He holds a 
PhD from the State University 
of New York at Buffalo and has 
published numerous artides on 
absenteeism data analysis, 
Leadership an.d methodo/.ogy for 
organizational research. 
Dow Scott is an associa.te pro-
f essor at Virgi.nia Polyteclmic 
Institute a.nd State University. 
He holds a PhD from Michigan 
State University and, prior to 
pursuing an academic career, 
was emp/.oyed by B.F. Goodrich 
Co. His research is directed 
toward productivity issues, in-
cluding absenteeism control, 
financial incentives and produc-
t iuity measurement. 
Personnel Administrator/FEBRUARY 1985 87 
terms of employment security, pro-
motion, personnel development ac-
tivities and feedback/complaint pro-
cedures. Freeman and Medoff 
(1979; l 98 l ) examined the ques-
tion of union effects by conducting 
an exhaustive review of the em-
pirical literature that examined this 
controversy. They concluded that 
collective bargaining has significant 
impacts on wage rates and person-
nel policies. Organizations with 
unions seem to have more rules 
and more rigidity in the scheduling 
of hours. 
Although a consensus seems Lo 
exist among managers concerning 
the adverse impact of collective 
bargaining, conflicting theories and 
mixed empirical results have cast 
doubt on the accuracy of this belief 
with respect to absenteeism. On 
one hand, Freeman (1976) sug-
gests that because unions focus at-
tention on workplace problems and 
encourage expression of discontent, 
unionized employees will say that 
they are more dissatisfied with their 
jobs than nonunionized employees. 
To the extent that job satisfaction is 
linked to absenteeisrri (see Porter 
and Steers, 1973), organizations 
with unions might be expected to 
have higher absenteeism rates. 
Henle (197 4) also hypothesizes that 
absenteeism is ~igher in unionized 
and governmental organizations 
because unions are more likely to 
obtain extensive paid-absence pro-
grams &om management. Leigh 
(19&1) examined both wage effects 
and sick leave benefit effects on 
absence due to illness for union 
and nonunion employees. His 
recursive model showed that sick 
leave benefits resulted in higher 
absence rates among union 
members despite the monopoly 
wage. 
Alternatively, Stoikov and 
Raimon (1968) argued that the 
more effective systems of industrial 
j l.U'.isprudence associated with 
unions results in greater employee 
job satisfaction. If the integrity of 
the grievance system is 
maintained- and this is dependent 
on bona fide trade union 
representation-Stoikov and 
flaimon expect job satisfaction to 
be higher among unionized 
employees. Thus, if the Porter and 
Steers (1973) argument is correct, 
the presence of a union should 
result in lower absenteeism. 
A third Cllternative provided by 
Allen (l 98lb) suggests that the 
presence of a union does not have 
a uniform effect on absenteeism. 
Allen (l 98lb) contends that 
absenteeism is the result of an 
employee's labor/leisure decision 
after taking into ac~unt the con-
straints imposed by the employer 
and by peer pressure. Absenteeism 
is higher where the union 
negotiates a paid absence program, 
provides more job security by 
reducing management's ability to 
discipline employees and bargains 
for linking pay increases to seniority 
rather than performance. However, 
Allen ( 1981 b) also notes that the 
presence of a union might be 
associated with a lower absenteeism 
rate because employees with good 
absence records do not want to 
support cpronic absentees, and the 
union exerts pressure to weed them 
out. Thus, the general effect of 
unions on absenteeism is am-
biguous, and depends on the 
union's relationship with manage-
ment. Allen's research (198l a; 
l 98lb) reflects this ambiguity. In 
the first study he found higher 
absenteeism to be associated with 
unions, but did not find that rela-
tionship in the second study. 
In addition to conilicting theories 
and research, the literature on 
unions and absenteeism seems to 
have overlooked a very important 
moderating variable, i.e., the effect 
of right-to-work laws. As an attempt 
to curb the power of unions, Sec-
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tion 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act 
(194 7) was passed to allow states to 
enact legislation prohibiting com-
pulsory union membership as a 
condition of employment. Since the 
passage of this act, 20 states have 
enacted such legislation. The major 
investments which employers and 
unions have made in contesting 
right-to-work laws attest to the belief 
that this legislation has a significant 
impact on the power of unions. The 
basic managerial argument for 
these laws is that existence of right-
to-work laws disrupts the monopoly 
power of the union to coerce (at 
minimum) financial support and (in 
practice) membership. To the ex-
tent that its recruiting power is 
limited, the union is forced to at-
tract members by other means. 
Thus, in right-to-work states, 
management expects that union 
relations will be more cooperative 
and less antagonistic than in states 
without right-to-work laws. 
However, research has also pro-
duced mixed findings with respect 
to this belief. Even though 
Lumsden and Petersen (1975) 
found that states with right-to-work 
laws had a significantJy smaller 
percentage of their work force 
unionized, they attributed the dif-
ference to the tastes and prefer-
ences of the labor forces in these 
areas. As a result, they concluded 
that the battle over state right-to-
work laws is symbolic rather than 
substantive. A.T. Kearney, Inc. also 
found that the success of unions in 
winning representation elections 
was not influenced by right-to-work 
laws (Current Developments, 
1981). In contrast, Moore and 
Newman (1975) found that union 
membership was slightly lower in 
states with right-to-work legislation. 
Wessels (1981) reported that the 
effects of right-to-work laws ap-
peared to have little, if any, effect 
on union membership, union prob-
lems or wages. However, he did 
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find a significant positive relation-
ship with job satisfaction for non-
union workers. 
Methodology 
To determine if the commonly held 
management assumption that 
unjonized organizations have more 
problems with ab enteeism than 
nonunion firms, five research que -
lions were inve ligated: 
1. Is the presence of a union 
associated with higher absenteeism 
rates? 
2. Are there major differences 
between union and nonunion 
organizations in their approaches to 
controlling absenteeism? 
3. Do unfon organizations have 
more formally developed atten-
dance control policies than non-
union organization ? 
4. Is the presence of a union 
associated with a paid absence 
program? 
5. Do difference between right-
to-work states and non-right-to-work 
states affect the influence that union 
presence has on absence rates and 
absenteeism control policies? 
Five thousand personnel 
managers from across the United 
States were drawn from the rolls of 
the American Society for Personnel 
Administration. The sample was 
drawn randomly with respect to 
size, industry and union representa-
tion. The return rate was approx-
imately 20 percent (N = 959), of 
which 62 percent were nonunion 
and 38 percent were union. A 
complete discussion of the sample 
demographics can be found in Scott 
& Markham (1982). 
A four page mail-out survey ask-
ed respondents to indicate which of 
34 methods of attendance control 
programs they used. (These 
methods are listed in Figure 1.) 
The survey asked for demographic 
information about the organization, 
1 including the absence rate. (Thus, 
the level of analysis for this project 
is autonomous plants or divisions, 
not individual employees.) 
For each method of control listed 
in the survey, respondents were 
asked first if their companies or 
agencies currently used this techni-
que. If they replied affirmatively, 
an additional piece of information 
was requested: How effective has 
this method been in controlling 
absenteeism? Four choices were 
provided for rating the effectiveness 
of a method: (1) not effective at all; 
(2) marginally ineffective, the 
benefits just below the costs; (3) 
marginally effective, the benefits 
barely worth the costs; and (4) 
definitely effective, successful. 
Results 
Question 1. Union/nonunion dif-
ferences in absenteeism rates. In 
response to the first research que -
tion, " ls the presence of a union 
associated with higher absenteeism 
rates?", average absence rates for 
union and nonunion firms were 
compared. The average absentee-
ism rate for the nonunion firms was 
4.2 percent (s.d. = 3. 9), and 
union firms had an average absen-
teeism rate of 4.5 percent (s.d. = 
3.5). Given sampling fluctuation , 
there is no Latistically significant 
difference between these two rates. 
It appears, therefore, that the 
presence of a union is not 
associated with higher absenteeism 
rates in this sample. 
Question 2. Differences in con-
trol metlwds. The second research 
question asks if there are major dif-
ferences between union and non-
union organizations in the methods 
used to control absenteeism. In the 
first column of Figure 1, the 34 
absenteeism control methods are 
ranked by their frequency of use in 
nonunion settings. The rated eff ec-
tiveness of each technique is listed 
in the second column. The third 
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column repeats the frequency infor-
mation for organizations that have 
unions. The fourth column shows 
the rated effectiveness for unioniz-
ed organizations. When comparing 
the frequency of program use for 
union and nonunion organizations, 
a difference of 12 percent or more 
between the two columns of fre-
quency data for nonunion and 
union sites is significant at 
p < .001 if a test for differences 
between independent proportion is 
applied. (See Glass and Stanley 
[1970) for computational details.) 
Overall, there is a high degree of 
similarity between the percentage 
of union and nonunion firms that 
use each control method. This is 
especially true for the first four 
methods listed. For example, the 
most frequent1y used method for 
both group is "employee call-in to 
give notice of absence" which is 
used by 99 percent of the organiza-
tions in both categories. 
Of the 34 methods listed in 
Figure 1, the frequencies of use of 
nine techniques differs by more 
than 12 percent. These nine pro-
grams can be subdivided into two 
categories: Those used more fre-
quently by union firms and those 
used more frequently by nonunion 
firms. 
The programs which are used 
more frequently by union firms in-
clude the following: (1) requiring a 
written doctor's excuse for illness 
and accidents (71 percent of the 
nonunion firms require this, as op-
posed to 89 percent of the union 
firms); (2) analysis of daily atten-
dance information at least monthly 
(used by 50 percent of nonunion 
firms and 68 percent of union 
firms); (3) improvements of safety 
on the job (used by 48 percent of 
nonunion firms and 70 percent of 
union firms); (4) wiping clean a 
problem employee's record by 
subsequent good attendance (used 
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by 41 percent of nonunion firms 
and 55 percent of union firms); (5) 
supervisory training in attendance 
control (used by 34 percent of 
nonunion firms and 48 percent of 
union firms); (6) formal work safety 
training programs (used by 34 per-
cent of nonunion firms and 55 per-
Flpre 1 
cent of union firms); and (7) 
substance abuse programs (used by 
22 percent of nonunion firms and 
37 percent of union firms). 
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~ U... 
Mechod al ConlrOI Pereen1 Vee F.11'~ Peftftll ller F.11'~ 
l. ..........,,_NI-in to re no11ee a1 ...__ 99"61 3.35 99"61 3.33 
2 . Ten......_._..._ ewelllw ..,.,...,_ 95 3.S 97 3."3 
3 . ~ ~lorewelllw .._.._._ 87 3 ."3 97 3.43 
4 . ldoeull8alion wl 41edpllne el etnple,.,ee 111Muint1J 
..._.._ polidee 86 3 .36 92 3.44 
s. lndueion el~ Nie - eqi1o,_ job 
pert_ .......... 77 3.23 47 3.11 
6 . A Clllllllalendy llPPiled ..........._. poley 77 3.44 83 3.50 
7. A demty wriaets ldlendmce poley 76 3.31 77 3.38 
8. Reqmre wriaela doetor'• eseuee lor llneMleccidenu 71 3.04 89 3.08 
9 . A eGll!lpWlll - ........._In a I~ employee 
orienlllllaa .-.r- lor new hire 70 3.09 73 3.04 
10. lWly llllardmce _.. m-Welned by ....,.w .... 69 3.33 66 3.28 
11. Se.---.' ..... ..........._. _..Wore 
........ eeledion cleeWoa 67 3.17 66 3.14 
12. An.ly9e al cWly ..........._. inf'Ol'llllllion ...... 
........., so 3 .36 68 3.41 
13. lmpo~e•l!lll• el ..recy - lhe job 48 3.13 70 3.13 
14. Peer pre--•e4 hy...,.... pe.n to fll 
In for..,_. employee 46 2.69 38 2.48 
15. Dllily ...,....._ _.. ................ hy per-t 
... rr'lrrleal "3 3.29 SS 3.45 
16. ....,.. ._ ........... empio)ee'• record by .... 
-.wit IJIOOd ..........._., 41 3.18 55 3 .08 
17. Superwt_,. ........ in..._...._ ClOlllrOI M 3.19 48 3.10 
18. FOl'llllll wOl'li. ..recy ........ .,........ M 3.15 55 3.18 
19. Employee intemewed llfter ..,__ 33 3.32 39 3.18 
20. flexllile wOl'li. eehedulee 26 3.29 12 3.10 
21. ....... ~el employee.-.---- 23 3.09 28 3.11 
22. s-..---.,..,...... 22 3.07 37 2 .90 
23. Employee bonm for peri'eet ..._...._ 18 3.01 10 2.83 
24. 
......... el won. IFllil llbeenleei.a - llllpC!n'i-·· 
...- ! ........... 18 3.21 17 3.05 
25. Spet ........ orplw al to elwJr. at~ 
reWhr e 17 2.98 29 3.01 
26. ..... __. ...... , .... ,emenll......_ lmple-
EDellled to redace .._ ..... _ 15 3. 14 7 2.92 
27. t:+ d• ..... WWW in .......,clellllome ..recy 14 2.83 12 2.79 
28. Mow . .. ,_ .............. .. ..__ ....... .., 
he_... •oradcled IO~ ,_•ev--.. lime 12 3.35 7 3.08 
29. Perleetl.-1 --* !.....,.__._.... 
-y 9 3.19 9 3. 19 
30. A• fr e.......,.,.._.,._~ 
reward) <I 2.60 2 2.88 
31. a-t ..._.,..._ lor aer.Wed-piwww daye <l 2.33 I 2.67 
32. Opendoa el day emoe t'or ....,..,_., drp r ilalll <l 3.5 <I 2.00 
33. LeaerlO ....- ............... _.....al_ 
plo,ee drre IO 8111 rrleei- <I 3.0 <l 2.00 
M. 'Ille .._...__ ClOlllrOI poley .... heen nepdmted 
In die lllDion eonlnld , ........ Giiiy lo ........ NA NA 32 2.98 
*NOie: S.mp1e eomi*41el367 uaion wl 592 •• .._. w1 ' ••-... 
92 FEBRUARY 1985/ Personnel Administrator 
n Inquiry Card Circle 257 o 
,-------
! ftr(!Jfier(!J 
l liWstrial Dr. N.E. 
I aJ33 Oak Rapids MJ 49505 l Grand~TulFree 
I 1-&X}. lbcut award 
I 0 f'd like to know more 
l propims. ..._or my bu9less 
I O Our~..,,..~lelld~ 
I ard is attached.~ cplC.e oo i lrtwlxtnh 
: ""' Ri'w Program 
I o Alni'1I JewekJ Proeram . 
I D Emblem I~-..-.. I o Please aa-
' I I 
I 
1--- ,.. 
f'rm 
TBD 
Those programs used more fre-
quently by nonunion firms include 
the following: (1) inclusions of 
absenteeism rates on employee job 
performance appraisal (used by 77 
percent of nonunion firms and 4 7 
percent of union firms); and (2) 
flexible work schedules (used by 26 
percent of nonunion firms and 12 
percent of union firms). 
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seem to be innovators with respect 
to new types of absence control 
programs. As opposed to the high 
levels of use reported by both 
union and nonunion sites for tradi-
tional programs such as employee 
call-in, termination and progressive 
discipline, newer methods which 
have been praised in personnel 
literature are used very infrequent-
ly. Examples of these programs 
which are used in less than two 
percent of either type of firm in-
clude operation of a day care 
center, use of random/lottery 
reward systems, and charting bio-
rhythms. 
1n light of the increasing 
economic pressure for higher pro-
ductivity, one might expect that at-
tendance control would be a high 
management priority. One item 
from Figure l indicates the amount 
of concern that management has 
given to the problem of absentee-
ism in union sites. Item 34, which 
applies only to unionized firms, 
asks if the absenteeism control 
policy has been negotiated into the 
union contract. Thirty-eight percent 
of the firms reported that absentee-
ism control was subject to negotia-
tion. Although arbitrators typically 
futd that management has the right 
to unilaterally establish attendance 
control policies and programs (T. 
Whyte v. Aro, Inc., 47 LA 1065; 
Abex Corp. vs. Wagner, 52 LA 484), 
this item could be of much greater 
importance in future labor contracts 
given the competitive pressures of 
the 1980s. 
Another way of looking at the se-
cond research question is to com-
pare the actual ab enteeism rates 
between users and nonusers of a 
specific program for both union 
and nonunion organizations. This 
information is provided in Figure 2. 
The data suggest a dramatic dif-
ference in the actual effectiveness 
of the various control methods for 
union versus nonunion organiza-
tions. For example, there is only 
one method (monthly analysis of at-
tendance data) that, when used by 
organizations with unions, results in 
significantly lower absenteeism. In 
fact, in examining Columns 3 and 
4 , there are two methods (requiring 
peers to fill in for absent employees 
and the negotiations of attendance 
policies in the union contract) that 
have a paradoxical effect. That is, 
companies reporting the use of 
these methods actually have higher 
.. ates of absenteeism. 
The situation for the nonunion 
companies, however, is very dif-
ferent. In Columns 2 and 3, there 
are six methods that, when u ed, 
are associated with significantly 
lqwer levels of absenteeism. These 
six include: (1) a consistently ap-
plied policy; (2) screening of 
recruits' past attendance record ; 
(3) daily attendance record main-
tained by the personnel depart-
ment; (4) public recognition of 
employee good attendance; (5) 
substance abuse programs; and (6) 
perfect/good attendance banquets. 
There was one method of atten-
dance control that had an opposite 
effect: Significantly higher rates of 
absenteeism are associated with 
supervisors having responsibility for 
maintaining the daily attendance 
records. On the whole, it appears 
that the presence of a union has an 
important effect on whether or not 
various attendance control method 
are effective in reducing absentee-
1Sm. 
Questwn 3. Differences in pro-
gram formality. lf unions see their 
role as protecting the intere ts of 
their members, one method of ac-
complishing this purpo e is through 
more rational, formalistic employee 
relations. One indication of more 
formalistic employee relations could 
be the choice and number of atten-
dance control policies. 
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In order to investigate this ques-
tion, an index of absenteeism con-
trol methods-in-use was constructed 
from the 34 methods listed in 
Figure 2. Each method was con-
sidered to be an example of a for-
mal attendance control program. A 
composite score for each firm was 
computed by totaling the number of 
programs that were currently being 
used by a respondent. Organiza-
tions which did not have a union 
had significantly fewer control 
techniques (13.8) than organiza-
tions which did (average = 15.2 
control techniques). This indicates a 
more formal approach to the atten-
dance problem in unionized firms. 
Supporting this conclusion was the 
fact that a high percentage of union 
firms were able to report their 
absenteeism rates (78 percent) 
compared to nonunion firms (64 
percent). Despite the fact that union 
sites had a greater number of con-
trol programs on average, the ac-
tual number of programs was not 
significantly correlated with absence 
rate (r = - .05; n.s.) 
In a post-hoc analysis of Question 
3, these data were reexamined 
by categorizing major absence con-
trol methods as either positive 
reward approaches or negative dis-
ciplinary approaches. The reward 
approach included the following: A 
paid absence bank (Item 28), flexi-
time work schedules (Item 20), 
monetary bonus for perfect atten-
dance (Item 23), a good attendance 
record banquet {Item 29), public 
recognition of employees with good 
attendance records (Item 21) and 
job enrichment or enlargement 
(Item 26). The disciplinary techni-
que included progressive disci-
pline programs (Item 3), a con-
istently applied policy (Item 6), a 
clearly written policy (Item 7), an 
explanation to new hires of absen-
teeism policies in the orientation 
program (Item 9), the identification 
and discipline of abusers (Item 4) 
YOUR OWN 
PERSONNEL 
PRODUCTMTY 
CONSULTANT-
Prentice-Hall's Personnel Policies and Practices 
Today's human resources manager wears many 
hats hirer. firer. trainer. 1ob evaluator. employee 
benefit authonty and morale-builder. But all these 
personnel functions lead to one common goal -
increased employee productivity 
Now you and your company can profit from the 
services of your own personnel productivity expert 
With Personnel Policies and Practices as your 
consultant, you'll be 1n on the latest proven tech-
niques that help you solve day-to-day personnel 
problems and motivate employees to peak per-
formance 
This dynamic looseleaf Service puts at your finger-
tips instant answers to virtually any question on 
human resources management: 
D How to select the nght person for the job 
[] How lo promote productivity and improve JOb 
performance 
D How to reduce absenteeism, lateness and mis-
use of time 
D How to motivate supervisors to become better 
managers 
D How to set up quality circle programs 
0 How to provide safer and healthier working 
cond1t1ons 
Report Bulletins, rushed to you every two weeks, 
keep the guide up to date and help you improve 
employee efficiency with the newest ideas and 
methods. Plus IMPACT - a biweekly, fact-finding 
newsletter - delivers eight pages of quick-reading 
news on human resources management. 
D How to train employees and develop their po-
tential See how Policies and Practices can get you over 
the product1v1ty hurdle- simply fill out and mail the 
GJ How to boost employee morale attached coupon 
S.A. Dunn, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Information Services 01v1s1on 
240 Fnsch Court 
Paramus, New Jersey 07652 
Please check the box of your choice: 
0 YES - I want to take advantage of all the help the biweekly 
supplemented Policies and Practices has to offer me. Please 
enter my one-year subscnpt1on at the rate of $354 (plus sales 
tax where applicable), payable 10 days after I receive my volume. 
0 Please send me - with no obligation - additional informa-
tion on Polic ies and Practices. 
(Please Print) 
Your Full Name 
Street Address 
City & State 
_Ph_o_n.;;..e ..:...< --'--------- 244 PA0205-01-8 
Circle 258 on Inquiry Ca.rd 
and monthly analy i of daily atten-
dance information (Item 12). Two 
scales, Reward Methods and Disci-
pline Method , were created by 
totaling the number of each that an 
organization used. Union firms 
have a great number of disciplinary 
control methods than nonunion 
firms (F ratio = 23.5, p<.0001); 
whereas the rever e was true for 
the reward tC'chniqucs. onunion 
organizations had a significantly 
higher number of reward methods 
than union organizations (F ralio = 
21.5, p<.0001). 
Interestingly, fu·ms with unions 
which have negotiated an atten-
dance policy have a more formal 
program than union firm that have 
not negotiated their policy. The cor-
relation between the number of 
programs used by a unionized firm 
and whelher or not attendance 
policy is part of the union contract 
negotiations is r = .20 (p <..0002). 
Question 4: Differences in hourly 
paid-absence programs. Paid 
absence programs have received 
special attention in the literature 
because such programs make 
absences less costly to employees, 
thus increasing their propensity to 
be absent (Allen, 198lb; Leigh, 
1981). Furthermore, a paid ab-
sence program makes individual in-
cidents of absenteeism more costly 
to the organization. Thus, the 
fourth research question asks if the 
presence of a union is as ociated 
with a paid hourly ab ence pro-
gram. The data for this question 
are displayed in Figure 3. 
F'ipre 3 
Of the 375 nonunion organiza-
tions in this sample that reported 
their absenteeism rates, 63 percent 
had a paid absence program for 
hourly workers. Only 32 percent of 
the 235 union firms had a paid 
absence program for hourly em-
ployee . Apparently the presence of 
a union does not guarantee that a 
paid-absence program will exist in a 
firm. In fact, management seems to 
be more likely to give employees a 
paid absence program if a union 
does not exist. 
The bottom half of Figure 3 in-
dicates that significant differences 
in absenteeism rates do not exist 
between union and nonunion firms, 
between firms with and without an 
hourly paid-absence program and 
between firms with a combination 
THE EFFECT OF UNION PRESENCE ON A PAID ABSENCE PROGRAM 
Dependent Variable = absence rate 
Paid Abeence P~am For Hourliee 
No Yee 
Union No 140 ftrnH 235 n..m. 4.2 
Preeen~~ 4.0 percent 4.2 percent percent 
Yee 195 firms 90 firm• 4.5 
4.3 peffent 4.9 percent percent 
4 .2 4.4 
percent pereent 
TWO.WAY ANOV A RESULTS FOR THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE ABSENTEEISM RATE 
SCMll'tt of V~e di F valae p 
Overall Mocirl 3 1.10 .35 
Union 1 1.49 .22 
Paid Abeence ProMJ°am 1 1.46 .23 
Interaction 1 .34 .56 
Error 656 
Note: Each ~omponenl&' F has been calculated bol~ conlllanl all other llOurcee of variance. 
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of the two conditions. It does not 
appear that the presence of a paid-
absence program has an ap-
preciable effect on the absence 
rates of the firms reported in this 
sample. 
Question 5: The effects of right-to-
work /,aws. One alternative explana-
tion for the lack of positive results 
presented in Figure 3 might be that 
all union environments are not the 
same. One potentially powerful en-
vironmental condition for unions 
may be the right-to-work laws. 
In Figtu-e 4 , this sample has been 
dichotomized into those organiza-
tions that have state right-to-work 
laws and those that do not. The left 
half of the table shows that the 
absence rate for the 465 organiza-
tions in states without right-to-work 
laws was 4.34 percent. The ab-
sence rates for organizations with 
and without unions and for organi-
zations with and without paid 
absence programs for hourly 
workers are shown along with the 
corresponding statistical test. The 
diffe rence between union and non-
union absence rates i.s significantly 
different (4.64 percent and 4.04 
percent, respectively). This dif-
ference co1Tesponds to the tradi-
tional managerial belief about the 
effects of unions on absenteeism. 
However, differences between 
absenteeism rates of union and 
nonunion organizations located in 
slates that do have right-to-work 
laws are rwt significantly diff erenl. 
(See the right side of Figure 4.) 
It appears that right-to-work laws 
are an important condition in 
understanding the relationship of 
union presence and absenteeism. 
In states with right-to-work laws, 
evidence supporting managers' 
beliefs linking unions with higher 
rates of absence could not be 
found. When organizations from 
right-lo-work states were removed 
from the rest of the sample, the ex-
peeled negative relationship be-
tween union presence and a high 
absence rate was revealed. Thus, 
apparently conflicting results in the 
literature with respect to the ques-
tion of union presence and absence 
(e.g., Allen, l 98la; l 98lb) might 
be resolved by holding constant the 
effects of conditions found in states 
that have right-lo-work laws. 
To further illustrate the effect of 
right-to-work legislation, note that 
the organizations in states without 
such laws (see Figure 4) which had 
both a union and a paid-absence 
program had the highest average 
absence rate (5. 14 percent) in the 
matrix. This result fits the common 
management expectation about the 
detrimental effects of unions and 
paid-absence programs on 
absenteeism. This compares with 
the same type of organization (i.e., 
union presence with paid absence 
program) in the right-to-work states 
that had the lowest average absence 
rate (3. 71 percent) in the matrix. 
Conclusions 
The common management assump-
tion that the presence of a union is 
necessarily associated with higher 
absenteeism was not supported by 
our initial results. However, the 
presence of unions in general did 
have an important consequence on 
the effectiveness of specific control 
policies. Quite simply, only one of 
the 34 programs in union sites 
resulted in a significantly lower 
absence rate when used. In non-
union sites, six of the 34 programs 
were associated with lower 
absenteeism. 
When differences between right-
to-work states and non-right-to-work 
states were examined, the effect of 
unions on absence rates was 
markedly different. In right-to-work 
states, there was no statistically 
significant difference between union 
and nonunion absence rates. In 
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states without right-to-work legisla-
tion, there was a marked difference 
between union and nonunion firms' 
absence rates. These data suggest 
that the right-to-work laws might be 
a significant environmental condi-
tion for understanding the influence 
of unions on absenteeism. These 
data also suggest an alternative ex-
planation for the previous am-
biguous findings in the literature 
with respect to unions and 
absenteeism rates. 
Henle's (1974) contention that 
unionized organizations would be 
more likely to have a paid absence 
program received no supp011 from 
these data. In fact, there was a 
negative relationship between the 
presence of a union and the 
presence of a paid absence pro-
gram for hourly workers. Stoikov 
and Raimon's (1968) argument 
that a union might increase 
employee satisfaction, the reby 
reducing absenteeism, did not ap-
pear to be supported either. Allen's 
(198 1 b) prediction that unions may 
influence absenteeism in both 
directions, thus masking the effect 
of unions on absenteeism, was not 
contradicted; however, the 
moderating effects of the conditions 
in states that have right-to-work 
laws seem to constitute a more po-
tent variable for explaining any dif-
fe1·ential union effects on 
absenteeism rates. 
The evidence presented here 
does show that there are some dif-
ferences between union and non-
union organizations in the policies 
and programs used to control 
absenteeism. For example, union 
fu-ms are more likely to have safety 
programs, absenteeism data on 
record and programs for wiping 
clean an employee's past absence 
record. They also have a greater 
number of formal programs for 
absence control and more disci-
pline-oriented techniques such as 
documenting absences with a doc-
tor's note. Nonunion organizations 
appear to have more flexibility in 
scheduling, as evidenced by the 
higher proportion of sites that have 
flex.i-time and reward-oriented pro-
grams. Finally, the presence of a 
union was not associated with a 
greater likelihood of having a paid-
absence program; rather, a negative 
relationship existed . 
In summary, it appears that 
unions have an important effect on 
absenteeism, although the relation-
ship is neither as simple nor as 
straightforward as proposed in the 
literatures. 0 
Fipre4 
Editor's Note: This article is based 
on a study funded &y the ASPA 
Foundatwn. The initial result.s of 
that study &y Scott and Markham 
appeared in " Absence control 
methods: A survey of practices and 
results" (June 1982). This artide 
resulted from many requests received 
&y the authors to reformat the data 
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Orpabalioa• la .a.le•.,,,,,_, lliPMo-Werk Law• 
N = 67t (465 la analyll•) 
Ab8ellele• Rate • 4 .M pereena 
Union 
Premeaee 
No 
Ye• 
No Ye• 
3.93 pel'ft!nl 4.09 perceat 
4 .36 pel'ft!nt 5.14 pereeat 
4 .20 pereent 4 .43 pereent 
Two-way ANOVA Re ..... ror the Dependent Verlalde: AJteea.ie Rate 
SOlll"ee of V arianee 
°"9nll Model 
v ... 
Paid AhRaee 
lnleraetion 
Error 
N = 290 (195 la aaalya•) 
Ab8enee a.a. = 4.30 perNnl 
Union 
Pre.-ee 
No 
Ye• 
No 
4.16 pereena 
4.26 pereenl 
df 
3 
1 
1 
1 
461 
Ye• 
F value 
1.88 
4 .47 
1.78 
.79 
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4 .21 peree•l 4.43 pene111 
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SOlll'ee et v...-...ee df F.at-
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Union 1 .28 
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lnteNelioe I ..... 
Error 191 
4 .04 
pereent 
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4.39 
p 
.13 
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.37 
pereent 
4.14 
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